Anyone reading my writings probably knows that I subscribe roughly to the moral theory of Utilitarianism. To me, we should be trying to maximize the happiness of everyone. Every sentient being should be considered important enough to be weighed in our moral calculus of right and wrong. In theory, this should mean we should place equal weight on every human being on this Earth. In practice however, there are considerations that need to be taken into account that complicate the picture.

Effective Altruism would argue that time and distance don’t matter, that you should help those who you can most effectively assist given limited resources. This usually leads to the recommendation of donating to charities in Africa for bednet or medication delivery as this is considered the most effective use of a given dollar of value. There is definitely merit to the argument that a dollar can go further in poverty-stricken Africa than elsewhere. However, I don’t think that’s the only consideration here.

Time and distance do matter to the extent that we as human beings have limited knowledge of things far away from us in time and space. With respect to donations to a distant country in dire need, there are reasonable uncertainties about the effectiveness of these donations, as many of the arguments in favour of them depend heavily on our trust of the analysis done by the charities working far away, that we cannot confirm or prove directly.

This uncertainty should function as a kind of discount rate on the value of the help we can give. A more nuanced and measured analysis thus suggests that we should both donate some of our resources to those distant charities, but that we should also devote some of our resources to those closer to home whom we can directly see and assist and know that we are able to help. Our friends and family, whom we have relationships that allow us to know their needs and wants, what will best help them, are obvious candidates for this kind of help.

Similarly, those in the distant future, while worth helping to an extent, should not completely absolve us of our responsibilities to those near to us in time, who we are much more certain we can directly help and affect in meaningful ways. The further away a possible being is in time, the more uncertain is their existence, after all.

This also means that we ourselves should value our own happiness and, being the best positioned to know how we ourselves can be happy, should take responsibility for our own happiness.

Thus, in practice, Utilitarianism, carefully considered, does not eliminate our social responsibilities to those around us, but rather reinforces these ties, as being important to understanding how best to make those around us happy.

Equal concern does not mean, in practice, equal duty. It means instead that we should expand our circle of concern to the entire universe, and that there is a balance of considerations that create responsibilities for us, magnified by our practical ability to know and help.

Those distant from us are still important. We should do what we reasonably can to help them. But those close to us put us in a position where we are uniquely responsible for what we know to be true.

In the end, it’s ultimately up to you to decide what matters to you, but may I suggest that you be open to helping both those close and far from you, whose needs you are aware of to varying degrees, and who deserve to be happy just like you.